

VOICES ON VALUES REPORT | January 2020

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GREEKS' ATTITUDES TO AN OPEN SOCIETY

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This study forms part of *Voices on Values: How European publics and policy actors value an open society*, a joint project by the Open Society European Policy Institute and d|part. The project was launched in September 2017 in Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Poland and Hungary. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Using original data from the *Voices on Values* survey, this report sheds light on Greeks' attitudes to an open society. After a decade of economic hardship and related political uncertainties, Greeks rate open society values highly, particularly those associated with political rights and freedoms, but also those linked with minority rights and cultural heterogeneity.

In fact, many Greeks demonstrate a deeply entrenched commitment to open society values relating to political rights and freedom and prioritise them over other economic, political, and social concerns. Nevertheless, some of them are willing to trade off those open society values for alternative concerns, such as economic and political stability. Overcoming economic problems will therefore be important if open society values are to be further strengthened in Greece.

Some Greeks reveal that their support for minority rights falters if it poses a challenge to their own cultural characteristics and way of life. This ambivalence in the cultural domain is also reflected indirectly in the characteristics Greeks consider essential for someone to be considered Greek. According to the majority, the most important of these is the adoption of Greek customs and way of life, while a substantial minority also considers ethnic- as well as civic-based characteristics essential for someone to be seen as Greek. Policymakers who want to strengthen open society values should clarify that the expression of minority culture does not stop the majority from pursuing their own way of life.

INTRODUCTION

Since 2010, Greece has undergone an unprecedented economic crisis: the contraction of its economy has been even larger than the slump the US economy faced during the Great Depression, and unemployment rose from 7.7% in 2008 to 27.3% in 2013.¹ The social consequences of this crisis have been tremendous and varied, ranging from a surge in poverty² and emigration³ to a significant deterioration in health standards.⁴

During the years of the economic crisis the political landscape of the country changed. Greeks moved both towards the political right and political left. For instance, Golden Dawn – one of Europe's most extreme far right parties⁵ – had been politically marginal for decades, but in the May 2012 elections its support rose by almost 7% and it secured 21 seats in Parliament. In addition, in the February 2015 elections, the hitherto small left-wing party SYRIZA gained 36.3% of the popular vote and formed a coalition government in partnership with the nationalist and conservative party, the Independent Greeks.

In 2015, a number of crucial events took place that shook Greece's relationship with the European Union. After six months of negotiations over bailout conditions with European authorities, capital controls were implemented in Greece and discussions over the country's potential exit from the Eurozone were revived. In July 2015, the so-called bailout referendum was held. Sixty-one percent of Greeks expressed their disapproval of the proposed bailout conditions. Nevertheless, a few weeks later the government agreed on a three-year bailout plan with harsher conditions.

In the same period, Greece began to experience the largest refugee inflow of its modern history: in 2015, approximately 885,000 people passed through the country in search of refuge.⁶ This humanitarian emergency prompted frustration with the EU: Greeks felt that the Union did not support Greece when asylum seekers arrived on the Aegean islands.⁷

1 Kentikelenis, A. 2018. "The Social Aftermath of Economic Disaster: Karl Polanyi, Countermovements in Action, and the Greek Crisis." *Socio-Economic Review*. 16(1): 39-59.

2 Ibid.

3 Labrianidis L. and M. Pratsinakis. 2016. "Greece's new Emigration at times of Crisis," *GreeSE Paper No. 99*. Hellenic Observatory: European Institute.

4 Kentikelenis, A., M. Karanikolos, I. Papanicolas, S. Basu, M. McKee and D. Stuckler. 2011. "Health effects of financial crisis: omens of a Greek tragedy." *The Lancet* 378(9801): 1457 – 1458.

5 Mudde, C. 2014. "The Far Right and the European Elections," *Current History* 113(761): 98- 103.

6 UNHCR. 2016. *UNHCR Data Portal- Greece*. Retrieved from: <https://data2.unhcr.org/>

7 DiaNEOsis. 2016. *The refugee problem and Greeks*.

Simultaneously, important social changes took place in Greece that contributed to the strengthening of an open society. Specifically, the country took steps towards the formal recognition of minority rights. Cohabitation Agreements were extended to same-sex couples, whereas they were previously limited to mixed-sex couples. Moreover, a legal pathway enabling second-generation migrants to become Greek citizens was introduced, while the construction of the first official mosque in Athens, the capital city, began, marking a move towards genuine religious pluralism in the country.

But how important are open society values to Greeks during this period of economic hardship? Do they consider them as one set of values, or do they prioritise some over others? Are they willing to trade off open society values if they believe it will improve their economic wellbeing and political stability, or do they actually endorse the social changes that lead to an open society?

Using original survey data, this report addresses these questions and aims to generate a more nuanced understanding of the values Greeks hold after a decade of economic hardship.

METHODOLOGY

This report uses original quantitative data collected as part of a broader project on open society values in a number of European countries. Data for this representative survey were collected online, using quota-sampling methods. The sample size was 1,012 respondents. The survey was carried out between February 12 and March 5 2018.

Respondents were first asked to rate the importance of seven attributes commonly associated with an open society, such as the equal treatment of newcomers, freedom of speech and the protection of minority rights. In turn, respondents were asked to do the same for seven attributes associated with a more closed society, such as the restriction of citizenship rights and immigration. The decisions about which attributes to include were taken by the researchers from the six countries involved in the overall project and reflect a coordinated effort to capture the Western tradition of political philosophy and its conception of open societies, as well as current political debates around values in all six countries. A full discussion of the conceptual ideas behind these decisions and the debates to which these correspond can be found in the project's publication *Voices on Values: How European publics and policy actors value an open society*,⁸ which sets out the detailed rationale and includes a full list of attributes.

After an independent analysis of how people evaluated the attributes associated with both open and closed societies, the researchers tested whether support for the former set of attributes remains when juxtaposed with other concerns. For this purpose, in the second part of the survey, respondents were again presented with the same seven attributes associated with open societies, but this time in relation to other concerns, such as economic security, political stability, and the protection of cultural traditions. Respondents were therefore asked to evaluate the relative importance of the two alternative choices: they could choose one or the other as more important, or characterise both as equally important. These trade-off experiments are artificial in the sense that they contrast values and concerns which are not necessarily in contradiction, but which are often presented that way in current public debates.⁹

Respondents were also asked general and country-specific questions. Based on dimension reduction techniques,¹⁰ two separate factors (open and closed society attributes respectively) were identified that were weakly correlated with each other. Therefore, two summary measures combining the scores of each set of seven attributes were computed and used in the analyses. For full details, please refer to the *Voices on Values* publication *The Hidden Majority: How most Europeans care about open society values*.¹¹

8 Eichhorn, J., V. Kupsch, L. Molotof, and M. Mohr. 2019. *Voices on Values: How European publics and policy actors value open society*. Open Society European Policy Institute and d|part.

9 Ibid.

10 For further information on the methods applied in this study, visit <http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org>

11 Eichhorn, J., V. Kupsch, L. Molotof, and M. Mohr. 2019. *Voices on Values: How European publics and policy actors value open society*. Open Society European Policy Institute and d|part.

PERCEPTIONS OF OPEN SOCIETY VALUES IN GREECE

Respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, and equality are among the foundational values of the European Union,¹² values that have long prevailed within the Western philosophical tradition of liberal democracy. In fact, the 20th century philosopher Karl Popper categorised such principles as an integral part of an 'open society' – which he characterised as a society where no one holds a monopoly on truth and where respect for the rule of law, civil rights, and institutions predominates¹³. Voices on Values defines related values as 'open society values' (encompassing values such as equal treatment of newcomers, freedom of speech, and minority rights). Values that stand in opposition to these (which, among others, are associated with the restriction of immigration and citizenship rights) are defined as 'closed society values.'

Data from the Voices on Values survey shows that Greeks uphold open society values. In particular, they endorse values associated with freedom of opinion and a plurality of views in political representation. Simultaneously, however, many of them also endorse some closed society values, such as cultural homogeneity. To understand the interplay in crisis-ridden Greece between open society values on the one hand, and closed society values on the other,

a thematic examination of these values follows. It focuses firstly on values relating to political rights and freedoms, and secondly on values surrounding minority rights and cultural pluralism.

COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

Greeks rate open society values associated with political rights and freedoms highly. Almost all of them consider both freedom of expression and the representation of all political views as fundamental for a good society. As illustrated in Figure 1, over 90% consider both open society values as either "absolutely essential" or "rather essential" for a good society. In fact, the composition of the Greek Parliament exemplifies the principle that all political views should be represented. A wide range of political parties hold seats ranging from the extreme far-right party Golden Dawn¹⁴ to the left-wing SYRIZA and the Greek Communist Party (KKE). Indeed, although other Europeans also rate the representation of all political views highly, Greeks ascribe comparatively more importance to this open society value.¹⁵

12 European Union. 2007. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01, Art. 2.

13 Popper K., 1945. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. Routledge.


14 It should be stressed that in the elections held in July 2019, Golden Dawn did not gain enough electoral support to enter Parliament. However, the data used in this report were collected in 2018, and therefore illustrate relevant preferences then.

15 See Eichhorn, J., V. Kupsch, L. Molotof, and M. Mohr. 2019. *Voices on Values: How European publics and policy actors value open society*. Open Society European Policy Institute and dlpart: p. 14.

FIGURE 1

Appraisal of values in Greece

IN YOUR OPINION, HOW ESSENTIAL ARE THE FOLLOWING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?¹⁶



Most Greeks also rate the ability of the media to criticise the government highly: 48% of them consider this “absolutely essential” and 38% “rather essential” for a good society, while about 80% of them say that groups and individuals critical of the government should engage in dialogue with it. Other Europeans also rate this set of open society values highly, but Greeks rate them as comparatively more important for a good society.¹⁷ This endorsement of political freedoms may be related to the political legacy of the Greek dictatorship between 1967 and 1974, and the fact that many Greeks have a lived experience of society in the absence of these values.

Nevertheless, despite advocating for the articulation of minority opinions, Greeks also reveal a preference for majoritarian rule: 87% of them believe that the government should always represent the views of the majority of people in the country. It seems that open

and closed society values with a bearing on political rights are not seen as in opposition, and many Greeks consider both to be important for a good society.

AMBIVALENCE FOR MINORITY RIGHTS AND CULTURAL HOMOGENEITY

Greeks also support the protection of minority rights: as Figure 2 illustrates, although only 30% of them rate this open society value as absolutely essential for a good society, 51% consider it as “rather essential.” Similarly, just slightly less than 80% of Greeks consider freedom of religious practice important for a good society. The construction of the first official mosque in Athens may have become possible because of the wide public acceptance of these values.


16 Note that in all figures percentages have been rounded and this is why for some questions the percentage is not exactly 100.

17 See Eichhorn, J., V. Kupsch, L. Molotof, and M. Mohr. 2019. *Voices on Values: How European publics and policy actors value open society*. Open Society European Policy Institute and IIPart

FIGURE 2

Appraisal of values in Greece

IN YOUR OPINION, HOW ESSENTIAL ARE THE FOLLOWING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?



Of the open society values that *Voices on Values* considered, equal treatment of people who recently came to the country receives the lowest levels of support. However, this does not mean that this value is not widely accepted in absolute terms: about a quarter of the sample considers this value “absolutely essential” and almost half “rather essential” for a good society. Notably, while showing overall support, Europeans consistently rank this open society value as the least essential for a good society of all the values studied.¹⁸

However, Greeks’ commitment to protect minority rights has its limits: approximately 76% of Greeks want as few immigrants as possible to come to the country. In other words, although Greeks seem willing to extend their rights to outgroups that are

already in their society, they simultaneously want to limit how many new outgroup members arrive.

This seems to be in line with a strong preference for preserving the cultural homogeneity of their society. Close to 90% of Greeks want everyone to live by the national values and norms of Greece. Additionally, approximately two-thirds of respondents say that the right to Greek citizenship should be limited to people whose parents hold it, or who are ethnically Greek.

Therefore, when it comes to ethnic and cultural homogeneity, not all Greeks regard open and closed society values as opposite extremes on a one-dimensional scale. In fact, many simultaneously embrace both.

18 See Eichhorn, J., V. Kupsch, L. Molotof, and M. Mohr. 2019. *Voices on Values: How European publics and policy actors value open society*. Open Society European Policy Institute and dlpart: pp. 14.

POLITICAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN A CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

But how committed are Greeks to open society values associated with political rights and freedoms? In the second part of the survey, respondents were asked to consider open society values *vis-à-vis* other concerns, such as economic and political stability, as well as cultural traditions. They were asked to say whether they found one more important than the other, or whether both were equally important. It seems that although their commitment to open society values associated with political rights and freedoms is high, for some of the population this support is fragile.


Freedom of expression is the most important open society value for Greeks (see Figure 1). As illustrated in Figure 3, when asked to weigh up the importance of this open society value compared to the principle of ensuring ethnic and national minorities are not offended, 34% of them rate the open society value as of secondary importance. Nevertheless, most Greeks (42%) indicate that both values are equally important and thus are not willing to trade either of these concerns for the other. When juxtaposing freedom of expression with the protection of Christian values, however, a slightly different pattern emerges. The differences between each choice become less stark and the group of de-prioritisers increases: 29% of Greeks are committed to safeguarding freedom of expression over Christian values; 32% of them say that both are equally important; while a slight plurality of 36% seems to abandon support for freedom of expression. This suggests that in addition to the importance of freedom of expression, the protection of the majority's religious values is also central for many Greeks.

FIGURE 3

Trade-off between freedom of opinion and minority protection, and defence of Christian values

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?

"That everyone can express their opinion freely"




It should, however, be stressed that for the most part, younger cohorts seem to prioritise freedom of opinion over the protection of Christian values. As illustrated in Figure 4, the majority of those aged 18-24 and slightly more than one-third of those aged

25-34 prioritise the open society value over protecting related religious values, and a further 13% and 28% respectively consider both equally important and are not willing to trade off the open society value.

FIGURE 4

Trade-off between freedom of opinion and defence of Christian values by age group
 "That everyone expresses their opinion freely" v "Christian values are not offended"

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?



Media freedom is also very important to most Greeks. As Figure 5 shows, when this open society value is juxtaposed with giving the government a free hand in implementing its policies decisively, about 76% of Greeks either prioritise the relevant open society value, or underline that both concerns are


equally important. However, when the alternative is that governmental decisions are guided by experts, the same percentage amounts to almost 60%. In other words, 37% of Greeks would de-prioritise freedom of the media in favour of expert decision-making.

FIGURE 5

Trade-off between media freedom and strong or expert-driven government decision-making

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?

"That the media can criticise the government"




Notably, on average the percentage of these de-prioritisers (those who across all trade-off questions most commonly tend to choose the alternative) is similar across all age cohorts, with the exception of the oldest cohort (at only 15%) (Figure 6).¹⁹

¹⁹ Internet usage among this age cohort is less widespread. As the *Voices on Values* survey was distributed online, this difference might be a result of self-selection.

FIGURE 6

Trade-off between media freedom and expert-based government decision-making by age group
 "That the media can criticise the government" v "Government decision making is mostly guided by experts"

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?



These findings suggest that after a decade of economic hardship, Greeks seem to want to see policy-making led by experts. This is reflected by the fact that in order to achieve it, about a third of them are willing to relinquish an open society value they think of as vital to a good society.

Figures 7 adds further evidence of this preference. Over 40% of Greeks are willing to trade off the


open society value of government-critical groups and individuals engaging in dialogue with the government if political stability and maximum economic growth ensue, while slightly more than 30% of them underline that the relevant open society value and related concerns are equally important. Interestingly, a similar pattern is also found among Italians, who have also experienced an economic crisis during the same period.

FIGURE 7

Trade-off between voicing opinions critical of the government and political stability, and economic growth

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?

"That government-critical groups and individuals can engage in dialogue with the government"




- Open society value more important
- Both equally important
- Other concerns

FIGURE 8

Trade-off between representation of all political views in parliament and specific compositions of parliament

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?

"That all political views of the population can be represented in parliament"



- Open society value more important
- Both equally important
- Other concerns

Compared to other Europeans, Greeks are less willing to trade off the representation of all political views in parliament for alternatives.²⁰ However, when scrutinising the relevant set of experiments, we find that almost 43% of them are willing to trade off this open society value in order to ensure that all parties represented in parliament adhere to democratic principles. Another 35% cannot choose one value over the other, as indicated in Figure 8. This pattern is prevalent across all age groups.

20 See Eichhorn, J., V. Kupsch, L. Molotof, and M. Mohr. 2019. *Voices on Values: How European publics and policy actors value open society*. Open Society European Policy Institute and dlpart: pp. 21.


As Figure 9 shows, a similar percentage of all age groups trades in the relevant open society value to ensure adherence to democratic principles.

FIGURE 9

Trade-off between representation of all political views in parliament and expectations about parties in parliament adhering to democratic principles by age group

"That groups critical of the government and individuals can engage in dialogue with the government" v "All parties represented in parliament adhere to democratic principles"

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?



In any case, as illustrated in Figure 8, when the alternative is the existence of a stable majority within parliament a different distribution emerges: 32% are willing to trade off the relevant open society value; 49% underline that both are equally important; while 17% stick to the open society value even under scrutiny.

Overall, Greeks seem to be committed to safeguarding open society values that capture political rights and freedoms. Only in a few cases was the most common response to trade in respective values for alternatives. The group of de-prioritisers of respective values increases mainly when the alternatives relate to safeguarding Christian values, as well as when they relate to the introduction of well-designed policies that would tackle the country's economic problems.

BETWEEN ETHNO-CULTURAL HOMOGENEITY AND HETEROGENEITY

As illustrated in the first section of this report, although Greeks endorse open society values associated with the protection of minority rights, they also reveal a strong preference for cultural homogeneity and a willingness to ensure that everyone in the country lives by the same values and norms. This is revealed not only when considering their commitment to relevant closed society values, but also when looking at their trade-off choices.


Greeks endorse the right to openly practise one's religion (see Figure 2). However, when this open society value is juxtaposed with protecting Greece's cultural traditions and values, almost 52% of Greeks are willing to trade it off, while 30% of them cannot decide between either option, as Figure 10 illustrates. When the same open society value is juxtaposed with ensuring that all people living in Greece share the same cultural values, almost 36% of Greeks are willing to trade it off, and 31% of them underline that both are equally important.

FIGURE 10

Trade-off between freedom of religious practice and protection of cultural traditions, and cultural homogeneity

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?

"That everyone can practise their religion freely"




Interestingly, those with higher educational qualifications are more committed to protecting open religious practice over both cultural concerns compared to those with lower educational qualifications.²¹

Simultaneously, despite their commitment to protecting minority rights (see Figure 1), many Greeks seem to be willing to safeguard this open society value only when it does not come at the expense of their own interests: as shown in Figure 11, close to half of the respondents prefer to protect the interests of the majority and to ensure that citizens never feel foreign in their own country, instead of protecting minority rights. However, there are some age differences in this pattern: younger cohorts tend to demonstrate higher levels of commitment to the relevant open society value compared to older ones (Figure 12a and 12b)

FIGURE 11
Trade-off between protecting minority rights and safeguarding the interests of the majority, and ensuring the majority never feels foreign in their country

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?

"That the rights of minorities are protected"




21 This time, no clear pattern across different age cohorts is identified.

FIGURES 12A and 12B


Trade-off between protecting minorities and safeguarding the interests of the majority, and ensuring the majority never feels foreign in their country by age group

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?

"That the rights of minorities are protected" v "The state ensures that the interests of the majority of the population are safeguarded"




"That the rights of minorities are protected" v "That the state ensures citizens never feel foreign in their own country"



Although Greeks commonly prioritise a culturally homogeneous society that emphasises the interests of the majority over minorities, in recent years the country has taken steps towards establishing a more inclusive and heterogeneous society. Specifically, in July 2015 - at a time when Greece was receiving a high volume of refugees and its membership of the Eurozone was under scrutiny - a new law was passed (Law 4332/2015) establishing the right of second-generation migrants to acquire Greek citizenship, mostly on the basis of attending Greek schools. Until then, Greece had one of Europe's most strict *jus sanguinis* citizenship regimes, which was defined solely in ethnocultural terms.²²

But four years on, how do Greeks define "Greekness"? *Voices on Values* presented a number of characteristics to Greek respondents and asked them to choose those they considered necessary for a person to be seen as Greek. As illustrated in the first section of this report, most Greeks say that the right to citizenship should be limited to people whose parents hold Greek citizenship or who are ethnically Greek, which seems to be at odds with this policy change. However, evaluating the essential characteristics for a person to be considered Greek, a more nuanced perspective emerges which indicates that the way in which Greeks define "Greekness" is more in line with the policy change.

FIGURE 13**Perceived essential characteristics for a person to be seen as Greek²³**

As Figure 13 shows, Greeks believe that the most important characteristic for someone to be considered Greek is their adoption of Greek customs and way of life; 42% of respondents say this is necessary, indicating a move away from a blood-based understanding of "Greekness." Being able to speak the Greek language is the second most essential characteristic of "Greekness:" 27% of the sample define it as essential. Moreover,

22 Christopoulos D., 2017. "An unexpected reform in the maelstrom of the crisis: Greek nationality in the times of the memoranda (2010-2015)," *Citizenship Studies* 21(4): 483-494.

23 The exact question posed to them is: "Which of the following do you personally consider necessary for a person to be seen as Greek?"

almost a quarter of Greeks considers that having at least one Greek parent is necessary for a person to be seen as Greek, while being born and living in Greece are considered essential characteristics for “being Greek” for approximately 23% and 20% of respondents respectively. The least important characteristic for someone to be seen as Greek is being an Eastern Orthodox Christian; just under one-fifth of the sample considers belonging to this religious denomination as necessary. Given the central role Greek Orthodox religion plays in Greek national identity²⁴ and considering approximately 90% of Greeks are Eastern Orthodox²⁵ this finding is surprising. The fact that this characteristic is regarded as the least essential for someone to be seen as Greek thus indicates a significant change in the conception of “Greekness” in line with more open society values.

Overall, most Greeks seem to have an ambivalent relationship with cultural homogeneity and cultural heterogeneity. Most of them endorse open society values associated with the protection of rights of minorities, but simultaneously want to ensure that this would not pose a challenge to their own cultural characteristics and way of life. This ambivalence is reflected in the characteristics they define as essential for someone to be considered “Greek”: although they consider the adoption of Greek customs and a way of life as the most important characteristics – thus demonstrating a move away from a blood-based understanding of “Greekness” – characteristics related to a *jus sanguinis* understanding of citizenship are still slightly more common than a pure *jus soli* one.

24 Chrysoloras, N., 2004. “Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political Culture,” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 4(1): 40-61.

25 Pew Research Center. 2017, May 10. *Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe*. Retrieved from <http://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-affiliation/>

CONCLUSION

Based on survey data from the *Voices on Values* survey, support for open society values in crisis-ridden Greece is strong. Within this framework, values that relate to political rights and freedoms seem slightly more entrenched in society than those relating to multiculturalism and cultural openness, which nevertheless also receive a wide range of support.

Despite heightened support for these values, for some Greeks it is occasionally fragile, as when asked to choose between these values and alternatives they trade off the related open society values. Although most Greeks usually prioritise the protection of democratic principles, some of them would withhold their support for open society values relating to political rights and freedoms if they believed that such a trade-off would ensure economic and political stability. Policymakers who want to strengthen open society values therefore need to reassure Greeks about economic and political stability.

Greeks' endorsement of open society values that relate to outgroups – variously defined – in society is, however, more complex. Although support for the protection of minority rights and the right to openly practise one's religion is strong, as well as equal treatment of newcomers, when these open society values are juxtaposed with concerns about safeguarding the majority's customs and traditions and ensuring Greeks never feel foreign, many tend to trade in this support. The fact that Greeks consider the adoption of local customs and traditions as the most essential characteristic for someone to be seen as Greek reinforces this finding. It seems that Greeks put a lot of emphasis on safeguarding their own way of life, and want it to be a prerequisite for extending rights to outgroups. Drawing on this insight, policymakers who want to strengthen open society in Greece should highlight that in such a society Greek customs and traditions will not be under threat, and that extending rights to minorities will not be at the expense of the rights of the majority.

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