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# THE FADING TABOO OF GERMANY'S NATIONAL PRIDE

## IMPLICATIONS FOR OPEN SOCIETY ATTITUDES

**OPEN SOCIETY  
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**“I like being German, just like  
all German patriots, which is why  
I reject nationalism.  
A patriot is someone who loves  
his own fatherland. A nationalist  
is someone who despises the  
fatherlands of others.”**

**Johannes Rau**  
Federal President of Germany (1999–2004)

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Germany's past has made Germans acutely aware of the dangers of nationalism. Celebrations of Germanness are still largely taboo. But this taboo is coming under pressure as many Germans seem to want to move past mere feelings of guilt and shame.

Some fear national pride may boost Germany's far right and endanger its tolerant and open society. Our report examines these concerns. Based on an opinion survey and interviews with German politicians, civil servants and civil society leaders, it analyses Germans' attitudes towards identity, pride and patriotism.

The survey data show that despite the sensitivity around the subject, Germans feel a latent sense of national pride. This is true of the general public as well as political elites. Whether more overt expressions of this pride pose a danger to Germany's open society depends on what informs them. If they

are based on pride in the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law), the welfare state, Germany's tolerance towards newcomers, or its role in Europe's integration, German patriotism need not endanger an open society. It may even promote its values. More caution is warranted when it comes to pride in Germany's cultural legacy, its economic power and its role as an innovation leader.

Yet our research has found that a majority of respondents take pride in attributes associated with support for an open society. This is why we encourage politicians and civil society leaders invested in Germany's open society to actively engage in the conversation about national identity and pride.

With the AfD promoting nationalism and national interests, and seeing a steady increase in its approval ratings and parliamentary seats, this re-engagement with German national identity and pride may well prove vital to Germany's democracy.

# INTRODUCTION

Germany has long had difficulties with the concept of national pride. Apart from football, overt displays of patriotism are still rather taboo. The question is, how long will this taboo last - and should it?

The burden of the Second World War persists, even if Germany has become more comfortable in dealing with its past. Once called the 'sick man of Europe', Germany is now undeniably Europe's largest and most successful economy. Its role in the management of the euro and refugee crises have put it at the centre of European and global affairs.

No longer 'leading from behind', Germany has become a confident player on the world stage. At the time of reunification, Germany's neighbours were afraid of its power, but today it has earned its reputation as a tolerant and open society.

The new confidence has seen growing calls for a re-evaluation of German pride (Kelle, 2017; Ulrich, 2017; Van Ackeren, 2018). Some commentators believe Germans should at last be allowed to enjoy a 'healthy patriotism'. Yet many Germans, particularly elites, still treat the concept of national pride with suspicion. They are concerned that opening up a conversation on German patriotism would embolden the nationalistic right.

These concerns have been magnified by the rise of the right-wing AfD. With its nationalistic rhetoric, the party has actively sought to challenge the taboo against celebrating Germanness. The AfD's message that German citizens should be allowed to move past feelings of guilt and take pride in their nationality resonates with a significant group of voters, but also faces strong resistance.

Events in Chemnitz in August 2018, when right-wing protestors attacked people who looked foreign after it was reported that a German had been stabbed by an Iraqi and a Syrian, have been used by some commentators to illustrate the point that not *all* Germans have learnt the lessons of history (Hill, 2018; Stanley, 2018; "The Riots in Chemnitz and their Aftermath," 2018). Their concern is that renewed national pride may endanger Germany's open society.

On the basis of our public opinion survey and interviews with political elites, we have investigated Germans' attitudes to identity, pride and patriotism. Our research reveals a latent sense of national pride and suggests that Germans are particularly proud of the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law), the welfare state and the country's cultural heritage.

Using correlation analysis, we show that this latent pride does not reduce support for an open society. On the contrary, pride in the basic law and the welfare state, for instance, is associated with above-average support for an open society. This suggests that we need a more nuanced understanding of patriotism, and that more overt patriotism need not endanger Germany's tolerant and open society. If based on democratic principles, it may well be conducive to it.

# METHODOLOGY

This report is based on original quantitative and qualitative data. The representative survey used online panels and quota sampling methods and sampled 1,046 respondents. To investigate their attitudes towards German national identity and pride, we asked respondents to what extent they identified with being German and if they felt proud of being German.

Respondents were also asked to rate the importance of seven attributes commonly associated with an open society, such as the equal treatment of newcomers, freedom of speech and the protection of minority rights. Respondents were asked to do the same for seven attributes associated with a more closed society, such as the protection of the majority's values and interests (over those of minorities) and a restrictive immigration policy. The decisions about which attributes to include were taken by the researchers from the six countries involved in the overall project, drawing on both the Western tradition of political philosophy and its conceptions of open societies, and current political debates around values in all six countries. A full

discussion of the conceptual ideas behind these decisions and the debates they correspond to can be found in the project's Key Insights Report "*Voices on Values: How European publics and policy actors value an open society*", which sets out the detailed rationale and includes a full list of attributes.

Based on respondents' answers, we computed two standardised sum scores, one for the rating of open (open society score) and one for closed society attributes (closed society score), with 0 the lowest and 1 the highest. Finally, we used correlation analyses to examine how feelings of Germanness and national pride interact with attitudes towards open societies.

In addition to the opinion survey, we also conducted 10 interviews with political actors – politicians, organised civil society leaders and civil servants. We probed them for their views on German identity and patriotism, and what they perceived as the biggest challenges to Germany's open society. We also discussed findings from the survey to identify any disconnect between their views and those of the public.

# A STUBBORN TABOO?

In the satirical 2016 music video *Be Deutsch*, comedian Jan Böhmermann skewers German nationalism: “Authoritarian nationalist dorks, so tough with your torches and pitchforks, you are not the people, you are the past. The true Germans come for you! Better run fast!”. He presents the ‘new Germans’ as open, social and tolerant, having learnt the lessons of the past and today being “proud of not being proud” (Neo Magazin Royale, 2016; Sanderson, 2016). That ironic last phrase suggests that the taboo on national pride has not only been effective, but remains an essential component of German identity. How did this come about?

## WHY GERMANS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CELEBRATE THEIR NATIONALITY

German reserve about celebrating national identity has been the result of a long process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (engagement with the past). Probably no other country has confronted its history quite as actively and openly, even though for Germany coming to terms with its past did not come about naturally or easily.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Germans were not eager to discuss the past, least of all in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the former East Germany. The GDR distanced itself from Nazi Germany by declaring itself an anti-fascist state with little responsibility for dealing with the war’s aftermath. In West Germany, people were keen to rebuild their lives, so coming to terms with the past was not a priority (Green et al., 2011, p.18).

By the 1950s, some intellectuals expressed dismay at the apparent lack of public reflection on the Nazi era. They encouraged people to engage with their past. In the 1960s, these ideas were taken up by the generation born during and after the war. The student protests of 1968 were largely driven by concerns that Germany had not adequately confronted its Nazi past, and that denazification had not gone far enough. These protests had a lasting impact and ensured that the debate became mainstream (Green et al., 2011, pp.19-20).

The debate sharpened further during the so-called ‘Historians’ Dispute’ of the 1980s. Conservative historians, including Michael Stürmer and Ernst Nolte, who in 1986 expressed dismay at Germany’s obsession with its Nazi past, said it was time to also highlight the positive aspects of German history (Green et al., 2011, pp.20-21).

Nolte argued controversially that the Holocaust was not unique in its cruelty when compared to the Russian gulags, thus implying that Germans did not need to feel guiltier than some other nations (Roberts, 2016). Many left-wing historians were appalled. Jürgen Habermas (1986) accused Nolte of downplaying Nazi atrocities, and stressed the continued necessity of ‘coming to terms with the past’ (Green et al., 2011, pp.20-21).

The ‘Historians’ Dispute’ made *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* a key issue when East and West Germany reunified in 1990. Reunification cemented Germany’s need to demonstrate that it was willing to face up to its past (Green et al., 2011). An



*Erinnerungskultur* (culture of remembrance) has since taken deep root in German society, and not only ensures that Germany will not forget its history but also that most Germans remain acutely aware of the risks of nationalism and pride.

To this day, some Germans are hesitant about celebrating their nationality. But others who internalised Germany's remembrance culture want to move beyond feelings of guilt and shame. Recent debates about a German *Leitkultur* and the establishment of a *Heimat* ministry reflect a desire on the part of many Germans to take pride in something other than 'not being proud'.

## **NATIONALSTOLZ REMAINS A SENSITIVE TOPIC**

Commentators have been writing about the end of the taboo on German pride ever since Germany organised the World Cup in the summer of 2006, when many Germans for the first time felt that they could be unashamedly proud of their country (Bernstein, 2006; Taylor, 2014; Stanley-Becker, 2017). Yet the taboo has proven surprisingly stubborn among political elites, as we discovered during our interviews with politicians and civil society leaders. Many interviewees expressed unease at the mere mention of the term *Stolz*.

*"I have always had a problem with the notion of being proud of something. I can only ever be proud of my own achievements. If I were French, I might have looked at this differently."*

Sophia Oppermann, Managing director of Gesicht Zeigen!

**"I am incredibly thankful for the fact that I was born with a German passport.... But I did not do anything for it. That's why I find it hard to be proud of it."**

Susan Rührich  
MP for the SPD

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*"I have difficulties with the term pride. I might be proud of my family, my children..."*

Director of a German public entity

This is not to say that all the interviewees felt this way. Christoph Bernstiel, an MP for the Christian Democratic CDU, claimed that there was nothing wrong with healthy patriotism but, paraphrasing former Federal President Johannes Rau, he made a clear distinction between patriotism and nationalism:

*"There's a good quote that says it all: 'The patriot loves his own, the nationalist hates what's foreign.' It's not bad to be committed to your homeland, to be proud of what your parents and grandparents achieved... We can also be proud that we are a strong democracy, that we are innovative, and that we have a strong economy. It becomes problematic when one begins to define oneself against others, if I were to say that I'm great because my culture produced more poets than any other culture.... That's where it stops for me... And this is well captured in that quote. It's not bad when Germany is confident, recognises its history and stresses the positive."*

For his part, Waldemar Herdt, an MP for the AfD, expressed frustration with the German taboo on national pride, suggesting that Germany should overcome its “culture of shame”.

**“Of course we’re not proud of it [the Nazi past], on the contrary. Yet feeling guilty doesn’t contribute anything. We can’t do anything about it. Also now we’re the fourth generation... We should never forget it, and should pass it on to future generations, but despite this [history], we have built the best country in the world.... Self-confidence is important for every person and for every nation.”**

---

Many political elites are clearly hesitant to display national pride. While some political actors may wish to open up the conversation about patriotism, German pride is still a sensitive topic. Yet, as shown later, a latent feeling of pride does exist, even among those who feel awkward about expressing it.

# GERMANS FEEL GERMAN

Despite the post-Second World War taboo on public displays of patriotism and the fact that many political elites still uphold it, Germans do not inevitably feel ambiguous about their national identity.

## GERMANS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Figure 1 depicts the extent to which our survey respondents said they identified as German on a scale of 1 to 10.<sup>1</sup> While 74 percent identified strongly or very strongly as German, around one sixth of respondents felt “somewhat German”. Only 10 percent thought of themselves as not very or not at all German. An overwhelming majority of German respondents identify strongly with their national identity.

**FIGURE 1**

Overall identification as a German

### TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK OF YOURSELF AS GERMAN?

Not at all / not very German (1-3)

**10%**

Somewhat German (4)

**16%**

(Very) strongly German (5-7)

**74%**

d|part (2018)

<sup>1</sup> Percentages in figures were rounded up to the nearest integer so some add up to slightly more/less than 100%

Respondents were also asked with which group they identified most. As shown in Figure 2, they identified most with their fellow Germans. Over half also identified strongly with people who shared their political views. Next were people who came from the same city, who shared their religious

beliefs or worked in the same profession. Religious identification was low, which is unsurprising considering the steady decline in membership of the Catholic and Protestant churches (“Kirchen werden kleiner – 660 000 Mitglieder weniger”, 2018).

**FIGURE 2**  
Group identification



d|part (2018)

## AN IDENTITY SHARED BY ALL?

Our survey data shows that the majority of Germans feel German, but is this equally true across age groups and regions? And what about gender and education? Do they matter when it comes to German national identity?

**Gender.** A look at Figure 3 shows that gender does not play a major role. Male respondents only identify slightly more as German (76 percent) than female respondents (72 percent).

**Age.** A clear pattern emerges when we look at age. Identification with German nationality increases with age: among 18-34-year-olds “only” 64 percent identified strongly with being German, whereas among the two oldest age groups the figure was around 80 percent.

**Education levels.** A similar pattern can be observed when it comes to education levels. Among respondents with high educational attainment (a university degree), 67 percent strongly identified themselves as German. Among those with medium educational attainment (high school diploma; completed vocational training) 75 percent did so.

Those with low education levels (who had completed lower secondary school) identified the most strongly, with 83 percent. The higher the education levels, the less respondents identify as German.


**FIGURE 3**

Identification as German by gender, age and education level


**TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK OF YOURSELF AS GERMAN?**

**Socio-demographics**


**GENDER**



**EDUCATION**



**AGE**



- Not at all / not very German
- Somewhat German
- (Very) strongly German

d|part (2018)

**Regional differences.** In absolute terms, variation between the 16 *Bundesländer*, Germany's federal states, is quite low (see Figure 4). Respondents' identification levels across most *Bundesländer* - with some exceptions, the most prominent being Hamburg - ranged broadly between 70 and 85 percent.

Self-identification as German among respondents from East *Bundesländer* is the strongest - even if regional differences between former East and West Germany are less pronounced than expected. But a closer look reveals some interesting insights. Respondents from East Germany (former GDR states), and in particular from Brandenburg (86 percent), Thuringia and Saxony (both 84 percent) but also from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (78 percent) identify strongly as German. Respondents from the two other East German *Bundesländer* - Berlin (73 percent) and Saxony-Anhalt (68 percent) - are closer to the average (74 percent). While this was perhaps to be expected in the formerly divided Berlin and now international German capital, the lower levels of identification in Saxony-Anhalt are more surprising.


Next come respondents from southern Germany - especially Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate (both 80 percent) and Bavaria (76 percent). Those who identified themselves the least as German were from Bremen, Hamburg and Saarland. A possible explanation is that Bremen and Hamburg are both port cities, and historically internationally oriented and multicultural. Saarland, meanwhile, once belonged to France with which it still shares strong cultural ties.

**FIGURE 4**

Identification as German

**TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK OF YOURSELF AS GERMAN?**

By regions



d|part (2018)

**Political affiliation.** Political affiliation mattered to many respondents and was another source of identification (Figure 2), so to what extent is identification as a German linked to political attitudes?

Perhaps unsurprisingly, when asked to classify themselves on a 10-point left-right scale, those who said “rather left” (values 7-10) identified the least strongly as German (59 percent), and those who saw themselves as “rather right” felt very strongly that they were German, with an overwhelming majority of 91 percent (Figure 5). Seventy-four percent of those who considered their political views as “somewhere in between” felt strongly German, exactly in line with the overall average. While those self-identifying as “rather left” identified considerably less strongly as German, it is important to note that numbers are still fairly high, at over 50 per cent.

As for the left-right classification, party preferences show clear and predictable differences (Figure 5). Respondents who said they would vote either for the CDU/CSU or the AfD if elections were held now were those who identified most as German. This was to be expected, considering both parties’ emphasis on national values.

Respondents who said they would vote for the FDP, the German liberal party, also identify strongly as German (82 percent), whereas voters for the social democrats, the SPD, ranked average with 71 percent thinking of themselves as very German. Green voters and voters of the left-wing Die Linke identified least strongly as German.


**FIGURE 5**

**Identification as German**


**TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK OF YOURSELF AS GERMAN?**

**Political attitudes**

**POLITICAL SELF-CLASSIFICATION** (on a left-right scale)



**PARTY PREFERENCE**



- Not at all / not very German
- Somewhat German
- (Very) strongly German

d|part (2018)

Despite the sensitivity around public displays of patriotism, Germans are not ambivalent about feeling German. Our findings demonstrate that most Germans identify strongly to very strongly with their nationality. The extent to which respondents feel German varies – rarely by large amounts – across socio-demographic factors of gender, age, education and place of residence.

Those who identify the most as German are older people, those with lower educational levels, and people from former East Germany as well as southern Germany. We also found that respondents who are politically on the right feel more German than those on the left. Despite these variations, an overwhelming majority of Germans exhibit a strong attachment to their national identity, with the lowest identification levels at around 50 percent. The question, of course, is whether they *take pride* in their national identity, which is an entirely different matter.

# GERMANS SHARE A LATENT FEELING OF PRIDE

Scholars like Andreas Wimmer (2017, p.619) stress that national identification is not the same as national pride: “The pride question refers to the moral, evaluative component of national identification, rather than to the strength of the attachment.” In a country where ‘not being proud’ is a component of national identity, one needs to be particularly careful when establishing links between identification and pride. Yet our research demonstrates that both the general public and political elites share a latent feeling of pride.


## THE GERMAN PUBLIC AND PRIDE

To understand to what extent respondents associate a feeling of pride with their national identity, we asked them which, if any, aspects of their national identity they were most proud of – the results are in Figure 6<sup>2</sup>.

**FIGURE 6**

Overall pride in aspects of German national identity

### AS A GERMAN, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE YOU MOST PROUD OF?



d|part (2018)

2 Respondents were asked: “As a German, which of the following are you most proud of?” and presented with nine attributes as well as the options “other” and “not proud at all”. Respondents could choose up to three attributes.



Strikingly, only 12 percent of respondents choose the option “not proud at all”. This means that 88 percent feel proud of at least one aspect of German national identity. This is particularly noteworthy since previous research has found that when asked the question “how proud are you of your nation?”, German respondents were the least proud among the 123 countries surveyed (Wimmer, 2017, p.621).

It appears that Germans are hesitant when asked directly about national pride – for historical reasons, expressing pride in Germany is still frowned upon. But when asked indirectly via specific aspects often associated with German national identity, respondents allow themselves a feeling of pride.

The attributes mentioned most frequently as a source of pride are the *Grundgesetz*, with 38 percent of respondents identifying with it, followed by the welfare state and Germany's cultural heritage, which both rank second with 30 percent.

Germans' attachment to the *Grundgesetz* is not surprising. After the Second World War, the new leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), in close cooperation with the Allied powers, sought to establish an institutional framework that would prevent the country from ever repeating history. The new Basic Law – not yet called the *Verfassung* (constitution) to stress its temporary nature pending reunification – was essential to this aim (Green et al., 2011, pp.28-30).

The Basic Law was an “explicit and direct attempt to prevent the mistakes of the past from recurring” (Green et al., 2007, p.30), and was to establish the foundations of a strong and ‘*streitbare Demokratie*’ (militant democracy). It contained many checks and balances, was centred on the primacy of the rule of law, and laid out essential democratic freedoms and rights, including freedom of expression, religious freedom and the freedom of assembly. These rights would be protected and enforced by a Federal Constitutional Court (Green et al., 2011, pp.28-30). At first, there was scepticism over the effectiveness of the new constitution. In the words of political scientist Jan-Werner Müller (2006, p.283):

**“Many legal theorists in 1949 regarded the Constitution as a problematic construct – a list of articles seemingly imposed from outside, deliberated over with hardly any publicity, and probably unable to withstand serious threats to democracy.”**

Jan-Werner Müller

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Müller (2006, p.283) notes that in time the Basic Law proved its potency, adding that the Federal Constitutional Court developed into one of the new Federal Republic's most trusted institutions. As Germany successfully reinvented itself, it was not long before West Germans identified positively with the new democracy and its *Grundgesetz* (Green et al., 2011, p.63).

Turning their backs on ethnic and cultural nationalism, West Germans embraced what later came to be known as ‘constitutional patriotism’ (*Verfassungspatriotismus*). Germany's democratic institutions and Basic Law provided safe and non-threatening sources of identification and – to some extent – pride. Prominent academics, like Dolf Sternberger and Jürgen Habermas, not only gave intellectual heft to constitutional patriotism, they also helped propagate it as the primary form of political identification (Green et al., 2011; Müller, 2006).

Germans' pride in the welfare state also has its origins in the years following the Second World War, when the FRG made a swift political and economic recovery. In the period termed the *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle), the German state established its welfare system, which became a symbol not only of Germany's economic prowess but also of the new democratic and social Germany (Green et al., 2011).

Unlike Germans' pride in the Basic Law and the welfare system, pride in the country's cultural heritage draws mostly on pre-war art, music and

literature – Goethe's *Faust*, Caspar David Friedrich's portrait "Wanderer above the Mist", a Beethoven sonata or a Bach fugue. Germany often portrays itself as *Land der Dichter und Denker* (country of poets and thinkers). This self-portrayal is still widely used in public discourse, for example in the social-democratic SPD's last national election campaign in 2017<sup>3</sup> (Ludwig & Seydack, 2017).

## German pride – a cross-cutting phenomenon?

But is this latent feeling of pride shared by all? Can distinctions be made on the basis of gender, age or education? And what about more attitudinal factors, such as political orientation?

**Gender.** There are no noteworthy differences between men and women (see Appendix, Figure A1). With the exception of Germany's tolerance towards newcomers, male respondents are – though in most cases only by a (very) small margin – prouder than women. The difference is most pronounced on the question of Germany's economic and technological achievements, which is over 10 percent higher among male respondents, but overall these differences are not substantial.

**Age.** While the *Grundgesetz* ranks first across all age groups, other attributes show more variations across age groups (see Appendix, Figure A2). The youngest group –18-24 – expresses considerably less pride in the welfare state (19 percent) and cultural legacy (12 percent) than the average, which is at 30 percent for both.

Those aged 18-24 and 25-34, with 15 and 16 percent respectively, are most likely among all age groups to say that they are not proud at all. This was perhaps

to be expected, as the youngest group of German respondents was also the one to identify least as German. This is in line with previous research, which found that a strong awareness of Germany's past is the reason many young Germans are sceptical of German national pride and patriotism (Calmbach et al., 2016, p.472).

The oldest age group (those aged 65+) tends to be the proudest. The difference between the youngest and oldest respondents is most pronounced on the issue of Germany's role in European integration, where the oldest group is twice more likely to be proud than the youngest. A plausible explanation is that the older generation witnessed the aftermath of the Second World War and is much more sensitive to the achievements of European integration.

**Education levels.** We observed no major differences in pride levels and sources of pride (see Appendix, Figure A3). Respondents with medium or high educational levels tend to be slightly prouder of Germany than those with lower education levels, with the exception of historical awareness and Germany's role as "leader of the free world". Those with middle and higher education are also more likely to select "not proud at all".

**Regional differences.** There are some interesting differences here – as shown in Figure 7<sup>4</sup>. People from northern Germany are the least proud (15 percent are "not proud at all"), followed by respondents from eastern and western Germany (both 12 percent) and, finally, those from southern Germany (11 percent). People from eastern Germany are less proud of the *Grundgesetz* (30 percent) than their fellow citizens (42 percent for western Germany and 40 percent both for northern and southern Germany).

3 The SPD put up posters across Germany with the slogan "A country of poets and thinkers needs a politics that invests in ideas".


4 As respondents could choose up to three attributes of which they were most proud, answers do not add up to 100%. The stated percentages refer to the percentages of respondents who chose the respective option.

**FIGURE 7**

**Pride in aspects of German national identity by region**

**AS A GERMAN, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE YOU MOST PROUD OF?**

Percentage of respondents, split by region



d|part (2018)

An explanation for eastern Germans' lack of pride in the *Grundgesetz* may be that before reunification it was not part of their constitution. They arguably had less time to develop an attachment to it and may find it harder to take credit for its existence. To verify this hypothesis, we need to compare West Germany with the former GDR states - including Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, now considered as part of northern Germany. As shown in Figure 8, West Germans are in fact prouder of the *Grundgesetz* than respondents from former East Germany.

Another explanation is that the Basic Law was "forced" upon East Germans; when West and East Germany reunified, instead of drawing up a new constitution, the new sovereign Germany kept the GDR's Basic Law (Green et al., 2011, p.59). That said, with over 30 percent of East Germans identifying the Basic Law as a source of pride, it remains their second most popular source of pride.

East Germans are also less proud of the welfare state - only 21 percent (22 percent if we include Berlin<sup>5</sup>) selected this attribute, compared to 31 percent of respondents from former West Germany. Again, this may have to do with the fact that the German welfare state, as it exists today, has its origins in post-war West Germany and is less ingrained in East Germans' consciousness.

East Germans - with 50 percent (a slightly lower percentage if we include Berlin) - are more than twice as proud of their cultural heritage as fellow respondents from West Germany. This may be because, unlike the *Grundgesetz* and the welfare state, Germany's cultural heritage is considered by many to date back to the pre-war period.

5 Having been divided into East and West (as part of the GDR and FRG) from 1960 until 1989, respondents from Berlin located in Eastern Germany cannot be considered to only have been part of East Germany. To address this, our analysis distinguishes between East Germany including and excluding Berlin.

Respondents from former East Germany also tend to be slightly more proud of Germany's economic power and technological achievements (Figure 8). West Germans, on the other hand, are twice as proud of Germany's role in promoting European integration. Considering that until German reunification only West Germany formed part of the European Community (later the EU) this is to be expected. Respondents from West Germany are also slightly prouder of Germany's tolerance towards

newcomers – the difference increases when leaving out Berlin.


Interestingly, there are no substantial differences with regards to pride in Germany's historical awareness. This suggests that, as discussed above, the *Erinnerungskultur* (culture of remembrance) has taken deep root across society, both in the former East and West.

**FIGURE 8**

Pride in aspects of German national identity split into former East/West Germany

**AS A GERMAN, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE YOU MOST PROUD OF?**

Percentage of respondents, split by former East/West Germany



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**Political orientation.** The contribution of political orientation is shown in Figure 9<sup>6</sup>. Predictably, people who self-describe as rather left-wing are the least proud, with 18 percent choosing the option “not proud at all”. Pride in the *Grundgesetz* and in Germany’s welfare state runs across the political spectrum, although moderates tend to be the proudest.


Germans who self-identified as on the right tend on average to be prouder of Germany’s cultural legacy, although the differences are not substantial. They are considerably prouder of Germany’s economic and technological achievements than moderates or people on the left, and of seeing Germany as “a leader of the free world”. They are less proud of Germany’s *Willkommenskultur* than moderates or people on the left. Just as there are no substantial regional differences on the issue of pride in Germany’s historical awareness, there are no noteworthy differences when it comes to political orientation.

**FIGURE 9**

**Pride in aspects of German national identity by left/right self-classification**

**AS A GERMAN, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE YOU MOST PROUD OF?**

Percentage of respondents, split by political self-classification



d|part (2018)

6 As respondents could choose up to three attributes of which they were most proud, answers do not add up to 100%. The stated percentages refer to the percentage of respondents who chose the respective option.

We found that not only do Germans identify as German, they also take pride in certain aspects of that identity. A total of 88 percent of respondents were proud of at least one aspect of German national identity. Older respondents and those self-identifying as politically on the right were the most likely to be proud of at least one German attribute. Those who were 'not proud at all' were most likely to be young, from the northern part of Germany, or on the left of the political spectrum.

The results demonstrate that Germans are particularly proud of the *Grundgesetz*, the welfare state and Germany's cultural heritage. Pride in Germany's *Grundgesetz* is shared across all ages and all political orientations, although people in former East Germany take less pride in the Basic Law than their fellow Germans from the West. Pride in Germany's welfare state is shared across all political orientations, although younger Germans and East Germans tend to be the least proud of it.

Finally, pride in Germany's cultural heritage is particularly pronounced among East Germans and less pronounced among younger respondents. The implications of these results for our main research question will be discussed in the next section. First, we look at whether German political actors also take pride in Germany.

## POLITICAL ELITES AND PRIDE

As we did in our public survey, we probed our interviewees about what they appreciated about Germany and/or what made them proud of their nationality. While many of our interviewees were wary of declaring themselves proud Germans, they found it much easier to list individual attributes they appreciated or were proud of. The attributes they listed were predictably often of a political nature, but despite differences in their political backgrounds, there was a lot of overlap on issues of pride. Notably, most of our interviewees expressed pride in, or at the very least attachment to, the country's democratic institutions and culture – the result of a deeply rooted constitutional patriotism, which is also responsible for the public's pride in the *Grundgesetz*.

## Political elites share latent pride in Germany's democratic institutions and culture

All of our interviewees - and in line with the general public - valued Germany's *Grundgesetz* and the German *Rechtsstaat*. Christoph Bernstiel, MP for the CDU, notes that Germany's Basic Law guarantees stability and protects Germany from anti-democratic forces:

*"We have the Rule of Law and the Grundgesetz, which have simply to be followed. Not even the AfD can undermine this... We have a very strong democracy that can protect itself from its enemies. And that will be shown now."*

Van Bo Le-Mentzel, an architect and member of *DeutschPlus*, a civil society organisation, appreciates the fact that the German *Rechtsstaat* and its Basic Law work for the benefit of *all* German citizens, not just the privileged:

*"I like our legal system very much. The Federal Constitutional Court really offers hope to many. If we apply this to the Basic Law and file a suit on its basis, then the Federal Constitutional Court can provide legal validation. You can claim your basic rights; you have to do something for it and it can be very hard, but it's possible. I do not know whether this can be done in other countries. Take the headscarf debate, and the case of Ludin. She sued in 2003 in several courts because she was not allowed to teach wearing the hijab, the headscarf. She lost every time. Then she went to the Federal Constitutional Court and the judges said: 'the Basic Law actually provides that she may wear her headscarf.' We've changed a lot of laws because of this precedent... By and large we have a pretty good legal system."*

The German *Rechtsstaat* is appreciated not only for its ability to protect Germany from anti-democratic forces and its effectiveness in protecting basic human rights. Marco Buschmann, first parliamentary manager of the liberal FDP's Bundestag faction, explains that like many Germans he has great confidence in the *Rechtsstaat* because laws and regulations are – for the most part – enforced:



*“The Rule of Law has a longer tradition in Germany than democracy. The concept was already very important during the empire. This cannot be overstated; the importance of being able to trust that fair, decent, reasonable rules apply. This is very important to Germans.”*

Some interviewees expressed satisfaction with Germany's federal system and in particular with its checks and balances. One senior official in the German Ministry of Home Affairs noted:

*“Our federal structure is unique... with its system of checks and balances... It is a very elaborate system and although there is often discussion about whether we should reduce the number of Länder (federal states), the democratic advantages outweigh the disadvantages.”*

Similarly, Susann Rüttrich, MP for the SPD, says the federal system's checks and balances ensure that Germany's dark past will not repeat itself, and protect democracy from hasty and poorly thought-through decisions:

*“Many security mechanisms have been installed to prevent the rise of a strong man or a strong leader, so it takes forever to enforce any new law. There is a good historical reason for this, even if it can be annoying. It protects us from snapshot decisions, from the politics of fear espoused by populists, from responding to ad hoc events with disproportionate political measures... Despite the inertia, it makes good sense.”*

The interviewees also appreciate the work of Germany's civil society and voluntary sector. MP Christoph Bernstiel, for instance, lauds the high degree of civic engagement:

*“One can be extremely proud of voluntary engagement in Germany. In this area, Germany is one of the leading countries in the world.”*

Some interviewees, including Sophia Oppermann (Gesicht Zeigen!), Susan Rüttrich (SPD) and Filiz Polat (Greens), express pride in Germany's *Erinnerungskultur* (culture of remembrance). Oppermann says it would not hurt if Germans were a little prouder of it:

**“I am really proud of the way we have dealt with our past.... We did this extremely thoughtfully, sensitively and critically, unlike many other countries. That's very positive and we could be prouder of it. That is, if we need to be proud of something.”**

Sophia Oppermann

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Oppermann is also proud of Germany's *Willkommenskultur*:

*“I am not a Merkel fan, but I am sincerely proud of what we, in comparison to other European countries, achieved in 2015”.*

A few interviewees also mentioned non-political attributes. Bernstiel (CDU) said he was proud of Germany's reputation as an innovative country and a strong economy. Waldemar Herdt, MP for the AfD, stressed his admiration for German *Gründlichkeit* (thoroughness):

*“They [Germans], like no other people, are thorough, well prepared, sensible and get the job done. I really appreciate this... Not for nothing do we enjoy such worldwide respect as entrepreneurs, as an economy.”*

Oppermann also expressed appreciation of the German language, German literature, German humour and Germany's healthcare system.

Despite some awkwardness, Germany's general public as well as its elites feel a latent feeling of national pride.

# GERMAN IDENTITY, PRIDE AND THE OPEN SOCIETY

Our findings show that both the general public and political elites have latent feelings of national pride. The German public is particularly proud of Germany's *Grundgesetz*, its welfare state and cultural heritage. Political elites are proud of Germany's democratic institutions and culture, and they share the public's pride in the *Grundgesetz*. What do these findings tell us about the consequences of more overt German pride for Germany's open society? Would patriotism endanger its open society?

## **A STRONG IDENTITY DOES NOT NECESSARILY CONFLICT WITH AN OPEN SOCIETY**

To answer these questions, we examined how feelings of Germanness and national pride interact with attitudes to an open society, testing how they correlated with evaluations of open and closed society values.

In the relationship between feelings of Germanness and open society attitudes, we find a statistically significant but weak negative correlation between identification as German and holding strong open society views (evaluating open society values as very essential for a good society) – as shown in Table 1. In other words: the more strongly someone identifies as German, the less likely he or she is to consider open society values like religious freedom or freedom of expression as important for a good society, although only by a very small margin. The same is true – in the opposite direction – for closed society views: those who identify strongly as German are more likely to consider closed society elements, like restrictions on religious freedom or the rights of same sex couples, as more important for a good society.



**TABLE 1****Correlation between open/closed society scores and identification as German**

Pearson correlation with identification levels as German (extent to which respondents thought of themselves as German)	
OPEN SOCIETY SCORE*	CLOSED SOCIETY SCORE*
-.147**	.347**

\* Sum of scores from individual items, recoded and standardised (0..1) separately for 7 positive and 7 negative items, where 0 is the lowest and 1 the highest score

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed)

d|part (2018)

The weak to moderate correlations mean we must reject the over-simplistic assumption that simply identifying oneself as German automatically implies substantially more negative attitudes towards an open society. If this were true, we would expect the correlation coefficient between identification levels and the open society score to be closer to -1, and the correlation with the closed society score to be closer to 1. German national identity does not have to stand in opposition to an open society.

## PRIDE – A POTENTIAL THREAT AND AN OPPORTUNITY

What about the relationship between national pride and open society attitudes? Respondents were most proud of the *Grundgesetz* (38 percent), followed by the German welfare state and Germany's cultural legacy (both 30 percent). What does pride in these attributes mean for Germany's open society?

We know that both the German public and Germany's political elites take great pride in the *Grundgesetz*. The fact that so many Germans are proud of the Basic Law, arguably the foundation of Germany's open society, appears to be good – rather than bad – news for it.

This is confirmed when we take a closer look at our survey data and how respondents' pride in the *Grundgesetz* is linked to their attitudes towards an open society. As shown in Table 2, respondents who are proud of the *Grundgesetz* tend to have slightly higher open society scores (with a mean score of 0.77) than average (which lies at 0.75). They also tend to have marginally lower closed society scores (0.47) than average (0.48). In other words: people who are proud of the *Grundgesetz* are slightly more likely to see open society values as important than respondents who are proud of other attributes, whereas they are less likely to evaluate closed society attributes as important for a good society.

Interestingly, respondents who are proud of the *Grundgesetz* also have slightly higher mean open society scores (0.77) than those who claim not to be proud at all (0.76). This is particularly striking when taking into account that being “proud of not being proud” is widely considered to be ‘safest’.

When it comes to respondents' closed society scores, those who are not proud at all, proud of the welfare state, of Germany's tolerance towards newcomers, or of its role in European integration, tend to have even lower closed society scores than those who are proud of the *Grundgesetz*. Respondents who are proud of Germany's *Willkommenskultur* (welcome culture) predictably also had the highest mean open society score overall (0.80). The second and third highest open society scores were among respondents who said they are proud of Germany's role in European integration and of its welfare state.

**TABLE 2**

Pride in aspects of German identity and mean open/closed society scores

Aspects of German national identity respondents are proud of:	MEAN SCORES	
	OPEN SOCIETY SCORE*	CLOSED SOCIETY SCORE*
Not proud at all (12%)	0.76	0.41
The <i>Grundgesetz</i> (38%)	0.77	0.47
Strong welfare state (30%)	0.78	0.47
Cultural legacy (30%)	0.76	0.50
Economic power (24%)	0.73	0.52
Being a leader in technical innovation & progress (20%)	0.74	0.52
Being a driver in European integration (15%)	0.78	0.46
Historical consciousness (14%)	0.76	0.50
Tolerance towards newcomers (13%)	0.80	0.41
Being the "leader of the free world" (9%)	0.73	0.52
Total (100%)	0.75	0.48

\*Sum of scores from individual items, recoded and standardised (0..1) separately for 7 positive and 7 negative items, where 0 is the lowest and 1 the highest score

d|part (2018)

Pride in Germany's cultural legacy – a theme the AfD in particular has been exploiting - does not imply a low open society score. Respondents who are proud of Germany's cultural legacy have a higher open society score (0.76) than average - if only by a small margin. Yet they also tend to have higher closed society scores than average. The same is true for respondents who are proud of Germany's economic power and technological achievements, with the latter group having the highest closed society score overall (with a score of 0.52).

A similarly high closed society score is to be found among those who are proud of "Germany as a 'leader of the free world'". Curiously, people who say they are proud of Germany's historical awareness also have an above-average closed society score. A possible explanation for why pride in these attributes is tied to above-average closed society scores may be that these can breed feelings of superiority –

for instance seeing Germany's economy as more powerful than that of other countries, or Germany's industries as more innovative.

This is also reflected in the wording: Germany as "a leader in technological innovation"; Germany's "economic power". This may also explain why respondents who are proud of "Germany as the 'leader of the free world'" have above-average closed society scores. The above-average closed society score for those proud of Germany's *Erinnerungskultur* is more difficult to explain, in particular if we also look at the interviews. Those interviewees expressing pride in Germany's historical awareness not only strongly embraced open society values, but also saw the *Erinnerungskultur* as an essential safeguard against nationalism and anti-democratic tendencies.

Whether national pride constitutes a threat to an open society depends on what it is based on. When

we look at the three most popular aspects of German national identity – the *Grundgesetz*, Germany's welfare state and its cultural legacy – we find that pride in them is associated with above-average open society scores. These also tend to be higher than for those who claim not to be proud at all. Caution

is needed for those respondents who are proud of Germany's culture, as they tend to evaluate closed society attributes more highly than average. These findings are confirmed in a correlation analysis (see Table 3).

**TABLE 3**

**Correlation between top three aspects and open/closed society scores**

Pearson correlation with pride in ...	OPEN SOCIETY SCORE*	CLOSED SOCIETY SCORE*
<i>Grundgesetz</i> (38%)	0.112 **	-0.042
Welfare state (30%)	0.125 **	-0.040
Cultural heritage (30%)	0.048	0.083 **
Not proud at all (12%)	0.016	-0.139 **

\* Sum of scores from individual attributes, recoded and standardised (0..1) separately for 7 positive and 7 negative attributes, where 0 is the lowest and 1 the highest score.

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed).

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While there is a statistically significant positive correlation between being proud of the *Grundgesetz* or the German welfare state and being supportive of an open society, there is no such statistically significant relationship between being proud of Germany's cultural heritage and being supportive of an open society. Conversely, while there is no statistically significant relationship between pride in the *Grundgesetz* or the welfare state and closed society views, we find a statistically positive relationship between pride in Germany's cultural heritage and closed society views – if a very weak one.

In other words, people who are proud of Germany's culture are slightly more likely to consider closed society attributes as more important. We also find that, if there is no significant correlation between not being proud at all and valuing an open society, there is a weak negative correlation with the closed society score. This means that people who claim not to be proud at all tend to reject closed society views.

We conclude that strong identification with Germanness does not necessarily imply a more negative attitude towards an open society, despite a weak correlation between the two. Our findings further suggest that, if based on pride in the *Grundgesetz* and/or the German welfare state – representing 60 percent of responses – more overt German patriotism need not pose a danger to Germany's open society.

This is even more true when that patriotism is based on pride in Germany's tolerance towards newcomers or its role in European integration – both being linked to higher open and lower closed society scores. More caution is warranted when it comes to pride in Germany's cultural legacy. While this does not imply less appreciation of open society values, it may be linked to stronger emphasis on closed society attributes. Even more caution is required when it comes to attributes that could possibly, if not necessarily, be linked to feelings of superiority, such as pride in Germany's technological and economic achievements.

The latent pride expressed by many of the political elites is also unlikely to pose much of a danger to an open society. German elites share the public's pride in the *Grundgesetz* and take great pride in Germany's democracy and culture. This form of patriotism, when espoused publicly, is unlikely to threaten an open society - in particular since almost all of the interviewees embraced an open society in one shape or form. More overt German patriotism can, but certainly need not be, in opposition to an open society.

## WHY GERMAN PRIDE MAY EVEN BE CONDUCTIVE TO A HEALTHY OPEN SOCIETY

German national pride need not endanger Germany's open society if inspired by the right motivations. There is even some reason to believe that it may make a positive contribution. The data shows that those Germans taking pride in Germany's *Grundgesetz*, its welfare state and its *Willkommenskultur*, not only have lower closed society scores, but also have higher open society scores. Cultivating a 'healthy patriotism' may well increase support for an open society.

A healthy open society arguably rests on citizens' pride in the elements that are essential to it - such as the national constitution, a tolerance towards newcomers, and arguably the welfare state. Indeed, according to Rüttrich (SPD), awareness of the democratic values one believes in is an important element of an open society. Buschmann (FDP) argues that collective self-confidence is necessary if an open society is to function:

*"One needs to be careful in the context of Germany's history. That being said...In this respect, states and societies are like people. Only people with a healthy sense of self-awareness are strong enough to be tolerant. He who knows who he is, who is content with himself, can be more tolerant of others ... Just like people with a personality disorder, who are experiencing an identity crisis, who do not know exactly who they are, are more inclined to aggressive and agitated behaviour. The same can be said for states. And this is why I think it's a good thing when there's a healthy self-awareness in Germany, when society is at peace with itself and knows itself."*

A similar argument is made by another interviewee, the director of a German public entity:

**"Self-confidence is good and important. This is the prerequisite to having the motivation to take care not only of oneself but of others too. To have the goal to shape and change certain things. Self-confidence is not a bad thing and is completely legitimate."**

Today's Germany is, for the most part, a successful democracy that has learnt from its past. The (self-) image of Germany as a tolerant, multicultural and open society, as captured in Jan Böhmermann's satirical music video, is largely accurate. There is little danger in taking pride in this achievement - as long as the past is not forgotten.

# IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Germans feel German and identify most strongly with fellow Germans – more so than with people who live in the same town, who share the same religious beliefs or practice the same profession. While there are some variations in the strength of this identification, depending on socio-demographic and attitudinal factors, this is true for all Germans – irrespective of age, gender, educational attainment or political orientation. Strong identification as a German is not confined to a minority or those who self-identify as being of the political right.

This has important implications for policy-makers and civil society organisations seeking to understand and counteract nationalistic aspirations. It highlights the need to distinguish between people who (strongly) self-identify as German and those who use their German national identity as a pretext to exclude others. Without such a distinction, the gap between the elite discourse on national identity and actual identification levels among the general public is likely to widen.

We also found that despite sensitivity about public displays of patriotism, a latent sense of German pride does exist, and we encourage politicians and civil society leaders to actively participate in the conversation about national identity and pride.

So far, the theme of *Nationalstolz* has been “claimed” by the right. Others have tried to avoid the topic – both because they feel awkward with the concept, and out of concern that a reassessment of Germany’s relationship with national pride may boost the far right, and indirectly endanger Germany’s tolerant and open society. And yet, whether a more overt

form of German patriotism is a threat to Germany’s open society primarily depends on what that patriotism is based on. Our research reveals that, if based on the right factors, German national pride need not endanger an open society – and may in fact be conducive to it.

This means we need to have a more nuanced understanding of national pride and patriotism, with the Basic Law, tolerance towards newcomers and Germany’s role in European integration as its objects.

Politicians and civil servants invested in an open society should take charge of the debate about “healthy patriotism” and, based on their own democratic consensus, should encourage pride in such things as Germany’s *Rechtsstaat* or its *Grundgesetz*. While pride in things like Germany’s strong economy should not be discouraged, political actors should be careful not to encourage feelings of superiority.

Recent calls for a reassessment of Germany’s relationship with national pride are an excellent opportunity for political actors to shape the narrative and instill *Selbstbewusstsein* (self-awareness) based on open society values – allowing for both a feeling of pride and self-awareness of Germany’s past. This also means that policy-makers and civil society organisations seeking ways to promote and protect an open society in Germany should no longer shy away from engaging with the concept of national pride. Instead, we encourage them to boost the concept with new meaning(s), while also critically engaging with its pitfalls.

# CONCLUSION

On the basis of a representative public survey and interviews with German politicians, civil servants and civil society leaders, we have demonstrated that the majority of Germans identify strongly as German.

We also found a latent feeling of German national pride, both among the general public and the political elites. The aspects Germans are proudest of are Germany's Basic Law, the welfare state and the country's cultural legacy. Despite some socio-demographic and attitudinal differences, pride in these things is shared across gender, age, education levels, regions and political affiliation.

Our research suggests that even though German national pride remains a sensitive topic among political elites, both they and the general public share feelings of pride. We argue that opening up a new conversation about patriotism need not pose a danger to Germany's open society. The risk national pride could pose to Germany's open society depends entirely on what that pride is based on. Pride in the *Grundgesetz*, the welfare state, Germany's tolerance towards newcomers or Germany's role in European integration need not endanger an open society -

and may in fact be conducive to it. More caution is warranted when it comes to pride in Germany's cultural legacy, its economic power and its role as an innovation leader.

Our finding that more Germans take pride in attributes associated with an above-average open society score than in those associated with a high closed society score leaves us cautiously optimistic.

German national pride need not conflict with an open society. If understood as being part of a self-aware engagement with Germany's past and present, it could even contribute to strengthening it.

Policy-makers and civil society organisations seeking ways to protect and promote Germany's open society should not shy away from national identity and pride. They should instead actively participate in and shape discussions about it.

At a time when the AfD is appealing to voters by invoking German nationalism, it may well prove vital for policy-makers and civil society to re-engage with German national identity and pride.

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# APPENDIX

**TABLE A.1**

List of open and closed society attributes used to compute open / closed society scores


OPEN SOCIETY ATTRIBUTES	CLOSED SOCIETY ATTRIBUTES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● People who have recently come to live in [COUNTRY] should be treated equally</li> <li>● Everyone can practise their religion</li> <li>● Everyone can express their opinion</li> <li>● Government-critical groups and individuals can engage in dialogue with the government</li> <li>● The rights of minorities are protected</li> <li>● All political views can be represented in parliament</li> <li>● Media can criticise the government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● As few immigrants as possible should come to [COUNTRY]</li> <li>● The government must ensure media reporting always reflects a positive image of [COUNTRY]</li> <li>● Everyone must respect the national values and norms of [COUNTRY]</li> <li>● Non-Christians can only practise their religion at home or in their places of worship</li> <li>● Same sex couples should not kiss in public</li> <li>● The views of the government always represent the views of the majority</li> <li>● The right to citizenship in [COUNTRY] is limited to people whose parents hold [COUNTRY ADJECTIVE] citizenship or are ethnically [COUNTRY ADJECTIVE]</li> </ul>

**FIGURE A.1**

Pride in aspects of German national identity split by gender

**AS A GERMAN, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE YOU MOST PROUD OF?**

Percentage of respondents, split by gender



**FIGURE A.2**

Pride in aspects of German national identity split by age

**AS A GERMAN, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE YOU MOST PROUD OF?**

Percentage of respondents, split by age

*Grundgesetz*



Strong welfare state



Cultural heritage



Economic power



Being a leader in technical innovation and progress



Being a driver of European integration



Historical consciousness



Tolerance towards newcomers



Not proud at all



Being the "leader of the free world"




**FIGURE A.3**

Pride in aspects of German national identity split by education levels

**AS A GERMAN, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE YOU MOST PROUD OF?**

Percentage of respondents, split by education levels



## AUTHORS

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Luuk is head qualitative researcher within the *Voices on Values* project. Luuk completed his PhD in Political Science at Royal Holloway, University of London. His thesis examined Germany's role in European monetary history and provided an explanation for Germany's reaction to the euro crisis. Luuk holds an MSc in Modern Chinese Studies from the University of Oxford and an MA in International Relations from the University of Warwick. He obtained his BA in Liberal Arts and Sciences from Maastricht University in the Netherlands.

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Magali is head quantitative researcher on the *Voices on Values* project. Before joining d|part, she was a business consultant in a market research company in London. She is also project coordinator at the Foundation FUTURZWEI, where she conducts research on attitudes towards the future among German young people. Magali holds a BA in European Studies from Maastricht University and an MSc in Global Migration from University College London.

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